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Multifunctional agriculture: 
The effect of non-public goods on socially optimal policies 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We develop a general framework for multifunctional agriculture, which includes not only 
public goods but also rural viability as a non-public good item. We contribute to the literature 
in two ways. First, we demonstrate how the broader definition of multifunctional agriculture 
differs from the agri-environmental multifunctionality, and how agri-environmental policy 
should be reformed to include these aspects. We show that rural viability entails adjusting 
fertilizer tax and buffer strip subsidy below their first-best Pigouvian levels to reflect the 
direct and indirect employment effects of agricultural production. Moreover, we show that 
when non-agricultural land use is present, an additional, non-agricultural instrument is needed 
to adjust the amount of land allocated to agriculture to its optimal level. In a parametric model 
calibrated to Finnish agricultural conditions and Finnish valuation of agri-environmental 
amenities and rural viability, we assess how the socially optimal provision of non-public good 
multifunctionality relates the socially optimal agri-environmental multifunctionality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The notion of multifunctional agriculture refers to the fact that agricultural production 
provides not only food and fibre but also different non-market commodities. These non-
commodity outputs include the impacts of agriculture on environmental quality, such as rural 
landscape, biodiversity and water quality. Often this list includes also socio-economic 
viability of rural areas, food safety, national food security and the welfare of production 
animals together with cultural and historical heritage. There is no universally accepted 
definition of multifunctionality, and emphasis given to various types of non-commodities 
differs. 
 
OECD (2001) provides a “working definition” of multifunctionality. This definition gives as 
the fundamentals of multifunctionality i) the existence of joint production of commodity and 
non-commodity outputs and ii) the fact that some of the non-commodity outputs exhibit the 
characteristics of externalities or public goods (OECD, 2001: 13). OECD emphasizes that in 
developing the notion, it is useful in the first phase focus predominantly on positive and 
negative agricultural environmental non-commodity outputs; we call this agri-environmental 
multifunctionality in what follows. Also, it is acknowledged that including food security and 
rural viability to multifunctionality is disputed and they do not fit well the framework of 
multifunctionality (OECD, 2001: 31). 
 
While OECD is rather cautious, the European Union Commission applies this broad view of 
multifunctionality, which includes environmental aspects, food safety, animal and plant health 
and animal welfare standards. Its proposals for the CAP Mid-Term Review (MTR) presented 
these multifunctional elements as key ingredients of the future agricultural policy in Europe. 
CAP reform means, in fact, that multifunctionality is promoted by cross-compliance and 
modulation. Cross-compliance refers to the fact that a single payment scheme introduced in 
the CAP reform is linked to the aspects of multifunctionality. Modulation stands for 
reductions in direct payments for the biggest farms to finance the new rural development 
policy, which includes methods that promote the environment and animal welfare as well as 
production of high quality food.  
 
Defining multifunctionality is complicated by international trade liberalization and the 
conflicting views upon it among the WTO members, mostly between the former Cairns Croup   5
and some countries practicing agriculture under unfavourable natural conditions (like the 
Nordic countries).
1 While the latter countries fear that reductions in domestic support would 
reduce the ability of governments to pursue their domestic non-commodity objectives, the 
former group considers multifunctionality merely as a pretext for maintaining high levels of 
production-related support (see Burrell, 2001). WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001 obtained 
a consensus about the importance of agriculture in preserving or developing the economic and 
social environment obligatory to sustain rural population. Every nation should guarantee food 
security for its citizens through a mixture of domestic production, imports and public stock 
holding. Furthermore, agriculture is important for conservation of biodiversity and 
maintenance of rural amenities. It was emphasized that the non-trade concerns (NTCs ) are 
public goods and, hence, not fulfilled through market mechanisms. Domestic agricultural 
support is needed to maintain production of these public goods on adequate level. (LD, 2001.) 
Cairns Group members agreed that support to maintaining production of NTCs could be 
recognized in the WTO negotiations, provided that this support is WTO-consistent, targeted 
and transparent not distorting the trade (Cairns Group, 2001). There is, however, plenty of 
room for further negotiations on defining the NTCs. Hence, the concept of multifunctionality 
will remain a subject for vivid discussion and further elaboration. 
 
Above discussion indicates that there is a consensus that multifunctional agriculture 
associates at least with the concept of agri-environmental multifunctionality, that is, positive 
or negative environmental non-commodity outputs produced jointly with the commodities. 
This has been also the starting point of the sparse academic research made on 
multifunctionality. Boisvert (2001), Romstad et al. (2000), Guyomard et al. (2004), Anderson 
(2002), Paarlberg et al. (2002), Vatn (2002), Peterson et al. (2002) and Lankoski and 
Ollikainen (2003), focus on the properties and policy design of multifunctional agriculture 
either in a closed economy or in an international trade framework.  
 
All these studies approach multifunctionality with the help of the theory of joint production. 
Boisvert (2001) exemplifies the qualitative role of both public goods and public bads by 
focusing on two agricultural commodities and two non-commodities produced with a land 
input and a purchased input. Land allocated to both commodities produce landscape amenities 
                                                           
1 Members of the Cairns group were:  Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay. 
   6
and the use of purchased input creates environmental residual. Using similar approach 
Peterson et al. (2002) provide a comprehensive analysis of multifunctionality. Policy 
instruments include taxes and subsidies on output, land and non-land inputs. They show that, 
although commodity intervention may be part of the optimal policy-mix, it is not necessary, 
since a set of input taxes and subsidies can internalise all externalities in the absence of 
commodity intervention. Moreover, the optimal policy necessarily consists of a mix of 
instruments including input subsidies, taxes or regulations, used in perfect synchrony.  
 
Vatn (2002) argues that there is a trade-off between the precision of instrument design and its 
transaction costs. If targeted instruments imply high transaction costs it may be reasonable to 
pay for provision of non-commodity properties by supporting the commodity output. Thus, it 
may not be rational to have free trade for commodity outputs while paying separately for non-
commodity outputs. Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003) allow for spatial heterogeneity and 
endogenous land allocation between two crops. This modifies the previous findings of 
Boisvert (2001) and Peterson et al. (2002) to reflect heterogenous conditions and suggests the 
use of differentiated corrective instruments to attain the socially optimal multifunctionality. 
They also analyze the social welfare of using second-best, undifferentiated instruments.
2 
 
Romstad et al. (2000) and Guyomard et al. (2004) focus on alternative policies towards 
multifunctionality. Romstad et al. (2000) analyze a Norwegian case with transaction costs 
when private and public outputs may be i) joint, ii) complementary or competing and iii) 
public goods are relational. In the case i), a price support is the most efficient instrument if 
agricultural sector is unprofitable. Direct payments for the public goods become more feasible 
for the case ii), but designing the first-best payment scheme is difficult in case iii). Guyomard 
and Levert (2001) allow for endogenous determination of market equilibrium under free 
entry/exit for farms, and analyze how traditional farm income support programmes (price 
support, production-linked direct payments, land-based direct payments, and decoupled direct 
payments with and without mandatory production) meet the objectives of multifunctionality. 
A decoupled direct payment without mandatory production is found to affect only farmers’ 
                                                           
2 Implications for trade policy can be summarized as follows. Paarlberg et al. (2002) show that multifunctionality 
never justifies trade intervention. It can be promoted by production related subsidies or taxes provided that the 
level of externality is linked to commodity output levels. Peterson et al. (2002) and Latacz-Lohmann (2000) 
analyze the trade and welfare implications of agri-environmental policies deriving e.g. following results. 
Peterson et al. (2002) show that results very much depend on whether the country in question is large or small. 
Latacz-Lohmann (2000) show that government intervention to internalize environmental externalities increases 
domestic social welfare even though it may affect the quantities produced and traded.   7
income, but with a mandatory production it increases the number of farms, while the other 
effects are indeterminate. A land-based direct payment increases farmers’ income and reduces 
input intensity. A production-linked direct payment increases farmers’ income, exports, and 
intensification. In both cases the effect on the number of farms is indeterminate. Guyomard et 
al. (2004) provides extension to the work of Guyomard and Levert (2001) by ranking 
agricultural support programmes to each multifunctionality objective.  
 
None of previous papers has focused on the non-public good aspects (such as rural viability or 
food security) of multifunctional agriculture. The reason is evident. Pareto optimality requires 
that all positive and negative externalities should be internalized, giving thus a firm 
theoretical basis to the concept of agri-environmental multifunctionality. The decision of 
whether or not other aspect than these public goods should be introduced to the social welfare 
function of agriculture, is a complex question. OECD (2001) notifies that in some occasions 
or from certain angles food security or rural viability can be interpreted as public goods. 
When this holds they boil down to the frame of agri-environmental multifunctionality, and the 
general Pigouvian policy applies: discourage producing public bads and encourage provision 
of public goods.  
 
As OECD (2001) observes and, for instance, Anderson (2002) forcefully argues, food security 
and rural viability cannot entirely be subsumed into the category of public goods. Beyond 
public goods aspect, the inclusion of food security and rural viability to the notion of 
multifunctional agriculture is a question of domestic social values. Hence, the question 
whether they should belong to the notion of multifunctionality is more an ethical than 
economic question and cannot be decided by theoretical work alone. However, economic 
analysis helps to clarify the consequences and policy implications of food security and rural 
viability when included into the broader definition of multifunctionality.  
 
In this paper we focus on the implications of the inclusion of rural viability as a non-public 
good item to the notion of multifunctional agricultural.
3 By doing this we contribute to the 
literature in two ways. First, we demonstrate how the broader definition of multifunctional 
agriculture differs from the agri-environmental multifunctionality, and how agri-
                                                           
3 Like us, Hediger and Lehman (2003) provide a welfare theoretical analysis of multifunctional agriculture in a 
small open economy framework. Their focus differs from ours in many ways. They assume homogenous land, 
which can be allocated between agriculture, forestry and manufacturing. Labor and land are inputs in production 
and environmental quality depends on land use and emissions.   8
environmental policy should be reformed to include these aspects. We will predominantly 
focus on just one non-public good aspect, namely viability of rural areas. In line with OECD 
(2001), we describe the core economic content of rural viability by employment in agriculture 
and in the rural sectors serving agriculture, and include the rural viability valuation 
component to the social welfare function. We neglect trade policy aspects, because our 
primary purpose is to examine the optimal design of multifunctional agriculture, which 
inherently is domestic policy question, even though has important connections to trade policy, 
as Anderson (2002) points out. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical model of 
multifunctional agriculture and develops the first-best policies to address it. By using Finnish 
data we assess in section 3 empirically how the socially optimal provision of non-public good 
multifunctionality relates  the socially optimal agri-environmental multifunctionality and 
private solution. A concluding section 4 ends the paper. 
 
2.  Multifunctional Agriculture: Towards a General Framework  
 
A natural framework for multifunctional agriculture is a model where the emphasis is given to 
heterogeneity and spatial aspects of agriculture and on the changes in farmers’ incentives 
because of changes in profitability between crops under alternative policies. We extend and 
re-examine the agri-environmental multifunctionality model by Lankoski and Ollikainen 
(2003). In this model of agri-environmental multifunctionality, biodiversity and runoff 
damages are the representatives of external and public good aspects of crop production (they 
qualitatively represent all other externalities/public goods such as landscape valuation or 
cultural/rural heritage). We extend this model to cover the broad definition of 
multifunctionality, that is, also non-public good aspects. The representative of non-public 
goods is the viability of rural areas, approximated by rural employment. Again, the number of 
types of non-public goods could be larger, but analytically this extension is sufficient to show 
the qualitative effects of the broader definition of multifunctionality. 
 
2.1 Agricultural landscape 
 
Consider a watershed with a single river running through it and agricultural land bordering 
this stream. For analytical convenience we treat this river as a straight line, and divide the   9
agricultural land into production units, rectangular parcels, each of which having an edge 
along the stream and extends perpendicularly away from the stream. The production units are 
normalised to have the size of each parcel to 1 unit (hectare) of the land area. Let the overall 
fixed amount of arable land be G. The land quality is assumed to be uniform in each parcel 
but it differs over parcels, and land quality is ranked by a scalar measure q,  1 0 ≤ ≤ q  (see 
Lichtenberg, 1989). Thus, G(q) is the cumulative distribution of q (acreage of having quality 
q at most) and g(q) is its density that is assumed continuous and differentiable,  ) ( ) ( q g q G = ′ .  
 
∫ =
1
0
) ( dq q g G        (1) 
 
The arable land can be allocated between two cereal crops, crop 1 and crop 2, and some of the 
land may be allocated to non-agricultural uses. The shares of land devoted to crop 1 and 2 are 
defined as  ) ˆ ( ) ( ) (
ˆ
1 q G q G dq q g L
c q
q
c − = = ∫  and  ∫ − = =
1
2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
c q
c q G G dq q g L , where 
N G = ) 1 (  and denotes the total amount of land. The share devoted to non-agricultural land 
use is defined by  ) 0 ( ) ˆ ( ) (
ˆ
0
G q G dq q g L
q
NA − = =∫ . Profits from non-agricultural use are by 
assumption independent of land quality and the return to it,  NA π , is exogenous. 
 
Figure 1 describes the sketched spatial structure of this model. The land is divided into 
uniform rectangular parcels and land quality improves from left to right. Through allocation 
of the land between the two crops as well as non-agricultural use, this landscape will be 
structured into various patches representing different land uses.    10
Improving land quality q
Idle, crop 1 and crop 2
Water body
 
Figure 1. The spatial properties of agricultural landscape 
 
Other features of the landscape will depend on the nature of agricultural production. For crop 
production we assume constant returns to land of any given quality, but decreasing returns 
with respect to inputs and land quality. The production function of crops 1 and 2 in each 
parcel is a function of land quality q, and fertilizer intensity,  i l . Hence, the per parcel 
production function is defined by  ) ; ( q l f y i
i i = . We make the following conventional 
assumptions concerning the partial derivatives:  0 >
i
li f ,  0 <
i
l l i l f .  
 
Also, we assume that cultivation requires employing per parcel a constant amount of labor 
input (measured in working hours) and capital, and denote them by  i n  and  i k , respectively. 
Capital intensity may differ between the crops. Moreover, higher capital intensity requires by 
assumption more labor input (working hours). The profit function of crop i per parcel is 
defined as the difference between the revenue and input costs: Also, we allow for a possibility 
that the farmer establishes buffer strips: 
 
[ ] i i i i
i
i i
i rk wn cl q l f p m − − − − = ) ; ( ) 1 ( π  ,    (2) 
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where mi denotes the buffer strip, and pi refers to the prices of crops and c to the fertilizer 
price, w to wage and r to the cost of capital. In accordance with the actual practice, we assume 
in (2) that the wage cost per parcel is fixed (as working hours are fixed) and depends on the 
actually cultivated share of the parcel. Capital cost is another fixed cost term but independent 
of the size of the buffer strip. This is natural, as machinery and equipment related to capital 
costs, such as depreciation, accrue irrespective of the size of the buffer strip. Both fixed cost 
terms affect our analysis: the size of the buffer strips is dependent on labor costs, and both 
labor and capital will affect directly land allocation and, hence, the social optimum. 
 
Choice of fertilizer input, the size of the buffer strip  and land allocation affect the 
environmental quality of our rural landscape. Assume that the society regards biodiversity and 
surface water quality as the most important non-commodity outputs in our agricultural 
landscape. We refer to Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003) as regards to the general discussion of 
these aspects. We express the valuation of biodiversity as a function of aggregate land use of 
each type including also non-agricultural use. Runoffs depend on the use of fertilizer and size 
of the buffer strips. For simplicity, non-agricultural land use does not cause pollution. 
 
) , , , ( 2 1 M L L L NA Ω = Ω ,       (3) 
[] dq q g L q m q l m v Z i
q
i i i i i ) ( ) ( ), ( ) 1 (
1
ˆ
2
1 ∫∑ = − = ,     (4) 
where  ∫∑ = =
1
ˆ
2
1 ) ( ) (
q
i i i dq q g L q m M , L1, L2 are defined above,  ) (⋅ i v  denotes the runoff from 
parcels devoted to crop 1 and crop 2, with  0 , 0 > >
i i i l l l v v , where  i i i l m l ) 1 ( − =  and 
0 , 0 > <
i i i m m m v v . Given Z, the society’s monetary valuation of runoff damages defines a 
damage function,  ) (Z D , which is assumed to be convex ( 0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ D  and  0 ) ( > ⋅ ′ ′ D ).  
 
2.2. Agriculture and rural viability 
 
Denote now the overall amount of labor related directly or indirectly to agricultural 
production, by N. This total amount consists of two streams of labor: labor used directly in 
agriculture (direct employment) and indirect employment created by agricultural activities. 
The total actual direct use of labor in agriculture, denoted by 
a N , is defined by   12
dq q g L n m N
q
i i i i
a ) ( ) 1 (
1
ˆ
2
1 ∫∑ = − = . The second, indirect employment effect emerges in 
agriculture serving intermediary sectors, such as retailers of fertilizer and capital, and services 
related to the use of capital. We denote this indirect labor by 
I N  and assume that it is a 
function of the actual use of fertilizers and capital via commerce and services. The actual use 
of fertilizer and capital is defined as  ∫∑
=
− =
1
ˆ
2
1
) ( ) 1 ( ˆ
q
i
i
i i dq q g L l m l  and  ∫∑
=
=
1
ˆ
2
1
) (
q
i
i
i dq q g L k K ,  
Using these we have  ∑
=
=
2
1
) , ˆ (
i
I
i
I K l N N , with  0 ˆ >
I
l N  and  0 >
I
K N . Finally, we also account 
for the (exogenous) employment in the non-agricultural land use and denote it by 
NA N . 
 
One could introduce explicitly the agriculture serving sectors into the model and define the 
agriculture-dependent employment there, but this is not necessary for our theoretical 
treatment. As pointed out in OECD (2001), conventional market effects from agriculture to 
the employment of sectors serving it do not provide a cause of including rural viability into 
multifunctionality, rather it is the special emphasis given by the society to rural viability in the 
form of employment. Therefore, we next introduce the social valuation of rural employment 
calling it rural viability valuation function, B, and define it as  ) (N B B = , where 
NA I a N N N N + + = . We assume that the marginal viability effect increases in N, but in a 
decreasing fashion, i.e.,  0 ) ( > ′ N B  and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ N B . Thus, for changes in the use of inputs we 
have,  0 ) ( > ′ =
I
l l i i N N B B ,  0 ) ( > ′ =
I
k K i i N N B B , and for the change in the size of the buffer 
strip  0 ) ( < ′ − =
I
m m i i N N B B .
4 
 
2.3 Socially Optimal Agri-Environmental and Rurally Viable Multifunctionality 
 
We assume that the government maximizes the sum of the producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus, but augments the social welfare function by the extra weight given to the rural 
viability. Thus, the social welfare function reads now, 
                                                           
4 From the definition of N
I we have for the derivatives: 0
ˆ
) 1 ( >
∂
∂
− = =
l
N
L m dl dN N
I
i
i i i
I I
li , 
0 >
∂
∂
= =
K
N
L dk dN N
I
i
i i
I I
ki  and   0 ˆ <
∂
∂
− = = i
I
i
i i
I I
m L
l
N
l dm dN N
i .   13
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1
0
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∗ ∗ ∗ ∫ π π π . (5) 
 
The first-best optimum is solved by choosing first the use of inputs and then allocating the 
land to its best use. The choices of inputs are characterized by 
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∂
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∂
∂
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∂
∂
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From (6a), fertilizer intensity in each parcel is chosen so that the value of the marginal 
product of fertilizer equals its unit cost adjusted with the sum of the marginal social costs and 
marginal viability benefits of fertilizer application. According to (6b) the size of the buffer 
strip in each parcel is socially optimal when the net loss of income due to decreased 
production equals the marginal benefits from runoff reduction and the constant marginal 
benefits from biodiversity production minus the marginal decrease in rural viability due to 
lowered employment. Given that the land quality varies over parcels, the socially optimal  i l  
and  i m  will vary over parcels, as well. 
 
A comparison of this outcome with agri-environmental multifunctionality entails setting 
0 ) ( = ′ N B , that is, assuming that rural viability does not matter. This comparison is 
condensed to 
 
Proposition 1. The Socially Optimal Use of Inputs under NPG-MFA 
Relative to agri-environmental multifunctionality, the effect of NPG-MFA, expressed through 
rural viability, is to moderate policy towards public goods and bads, because now the society 
trade-offs public goods aspects with viability aspects. Thus, fertilizer intensity is higher, 
buffer strips are smaller and employment in agriculture is higher than under AE-MFA. 
 
Proposition 1 implies that now socially optimal policy shifts away from the first-best 
Pigouvian policy due to employment considerations.   14
 
Next the social planner allocates land to crops 1 and 2 taking into account the effects of land 
allocation on diversity, nutrient runoffs and rural viability. To facilitate the land allocation we 
make the following assumptions. First, there is some land quality level for each crop, denoted 
by  i q ˆ , for which the social rent is zero. Without a loss of generality we assume that this 
marginal land quality is lower for crop 1 than for crop 2. Second, the social returns are higher 
for crop 2 on the land of highest quality. Third, the social returns as a function of land quality 
increase more rapidly for crop 2 on all parcels. Fourth, by assumption profits from non-
agricultural land use are constant and independent of land quality. Moreover, non-agricultural 
land use is more profitable than crop production only on the lowest qualities of land. Under 
these assumptions the critical switching land quality,
c q , and the marginal land quality  i q ˆ  
become uniquely determined, and the whole area of arable land is divided into a unique, 
compact ranges of land qualities for both crops and non-agricultural land use.
  
 
The critical switching land quality, 
c q , and the marginal land quality q ˆ  are defined by 
 
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( L L L L B v D B v D + Ω + ⋅ ′ − = + Ω + ⋅ ′ −
∗ ∗ π π        (7a) 
NA NA L L NA L L B B v D + Ω + = + Ω + ⋅ ′ −
∗ ∗ π π
1 1 1 1 ) (        (7b) 
 
Assuming, again, for a moment that  0 ) ( = ′ N B , allows us to trace the land allocation under 
agri-environmental multifunctionality. Now the condition (7a) for the switching land quality 
becomes: 
2 1 2 2 1 1 ) ( ) ( L L v D v D Ω + ⋅ ′ − = Ω + ⋅ ′ −
∗ ∗ π π , which is the same as in Lankoski and 
Ollikainen (2003). It simply requires land allocated between the two crops so that the social 
returns from both crops in terms of revenue, runoff damages and biodiversity benefits are 
equal. From (7b) we have a new condition for the marginal land quality 
NA L NA L v D Ω + = Ω + ⋅ ′ −
∗ ∗ π π
1 1 1 ) ( .  This requires that land is allocated to agriculture up to the 
point where the social return from agriculture equals the social return of the land allocated to 
non-agricultural use. 
 
Allowing now  0 ) ( > ′ N B  reveals how rural viability changes land allocation relative to AE-
MFA. We collect these findings in Proposition 2. 
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Proposition 2. Socially Optimal Land Allocation under NPG-MFA 
Relative to agri-environmental multifunctionality, NPG-MFA, expressed through rural 
viability, changes land allocation: a) within agriculture towards the crop which entails higher 
use of labour within agriculture and b) between agricultural and non-agricultural land use 
towards land use which entails higher use of labour. 
 
Proposition 2 implies that if the labour intensity is higher in the production of more polluting 
crop 2, some additional land will be allocated to it via marginal viability effect. Interestingly, 
inclusion of rural viability had implications to the marginal land quality as well. Marginal 
land quality may increase or decrease depending on whether the land in crop 1 or in the non-
agricultural land use has higher marginal viability effect. Ceteris paribus, if non-agricultural 
land use has higher marginal impact on rural viability, more land is allocated outside 
agriculture and vice versa. This also means that the concept of rural viability applies also 
outside agriculture and has broader implications to general regional policy.  
 
2.4 Socially optimal design of multifunctional policy instruments 
 
We next ask how does rural viability affect the design of multifunctional policy? Recall 
Propositions 1 and 2. They imply that one needs instruments within agriculture to affect the 
use of inputs and land allocation between crops. Moreover, as the marginal land quality is a 
function of social returns to non-agricultural land use, an additional instrument is needed to 
ensure the achievement of optimal allocation of land between agricultural and non-
agricultural use. In what follows we establish these findings in a more rigorous way. 
 
Note first that the privately optimum solution, extracted from equations (6a) - (6d), entails 
0 = − = c f p
i
l i
i
l i i π ,  [ ] 0 ) ; ( ≤ − − − = i i i
i
i
i
m wn cl q l f p
i π . Thus, while the use of fertilizer is 
higher, the size of the buffer strips is smaller than in the social optimum. In fact, without any 
socially-induced incentives, the privately optimal level of buffer strips is zero due to net loss 
of income. Hence, it is optimal to choose a tax/ subsidy to handle the (positive or negative) 
externality of each input.  
 
Postulate now a crop specific unit tax  i τ  on the use of fertilizer (the after-tax unit price is 
) 1 ( i i c c τ + =
∗ ) and a buffer strip subsidy is  ) ( i m b with 0 ) ( ' < i m b . Inserting these instruments 
into privately optimal conditions and setting them equal to the socially optimal conditions 
(6a) and (6b) allows us after some subtractions to define the optimal tax and subsidy rates   16
from the following two equations system: 
I
l
i
i
i i N N B
l
v
Z D c ) ( ) ( ′ +
∂
∂
′ − = − τ  and 
I
m M
i
i
i i i i N N B
m
v
Z D m b l c ) ( ) ( ) ( ′ + Ω +
∂
∂
′ − = ′ + τ . Solving this system for fertilizer tax and buffer 
strip subsidy gives: 
 
I
l l i i i N N B Z Z D ) ( ) ( − ′ =
∗ τ        ( 8 a )  
M i
I
l
I
m i l m i l N N N B l Z Z Z D m b
i i i i Ω + + ′ + + ′ − = ′
∗ ) )( ( ) )( ( ) (    (8b) 
 
The implications of rural viability on the use of agri-environmental instruments become 
evident in (8a) and (8b). In the absence of rural viability, the optimal effective fertilizer tax 
( c i i τ τ =
∗ ) would reflect the social costs of fertilizer use only. When rural viability is present 
fertilizer tax is decreased from its Pigouvian level to reflect the employment effects of 
fertilizer use. Similarly, if  0 ) ( = ′ N B , the optimal marginal buffer strip subsidy would reflect 
only its environmental effects, that is, the constant marginal biodiversity effect, its direct 
effect of reducing runoffs and indirect effects of allowing for a slightly higher fertilizer 
intensity. Accounting for rural viability effect would clearly decrease its size, because buffer 
strips tend to decrease the direct and indirect labour. 
 
Proposition 3.  The Design of Instruments under NPG-MFA 
The socially optimal multifunctional agriculture under heterogeneous land quality requires 
the use of differentiated instruments on fertilizer and buffer strips inputs, set below their first-
best levels because trade-offing the rural viability effect via employment with promoting 
public goods and reducing public bads.  
 
Equations (8a) and (8b) and Proposition 3 entail that the switching land quality between crops 
1 and 2 becomes determined in a socially optimal way (to ascertain this insert the optimal 
instruments in private land allocation condition to see that they become identical with the 
socially optimal one). They do not, however, define the marginal land quality, which partly 
depends on the social returns on non-agricultural use of land. To see how rural viability 
affects the use of instruments between agricultural and non-agricultural land use, re-express 
condition (8b) governing marginal land quality as private solution where socially optimal 
instrument are used in agriculture but no instruments are used in non-agricultural land use: 
∗ ∗ = + Ω + ⋅ ′ − NA L L B v D π π
1 1 1 1 ) ( . Comparing this with (8b) immediately reveals that too much   17
land is allocated to agriculture, because agents in non-agricultural land use do not account for 
their effects on biodiversity and rural viability. Hence, NPG-MFA implies that 
 
Corollary. Policy targeted to Non-Agricultural Land Use 
Under NPG-MFA it is socially optimal to subsidize non-agricultural land use according to its 
biodiversity and rural viability effects so as to ensure optimal land allocation between 
agricultural and non-agricultural land use. 
 
Hence, not only concerns but also design of policies will go beyond the limits of agriculture. 
Economic intuition of Corollary is the following.  Tax and subsidy policies within agriculture 
adjust the input intensities and land allocation between two crops to the social optimum. Any 
attempt to correct land allocation between crop 1 (cultivated on the lower quality land) and 
non-.agricultural use by using agri-environmental instruments would distort land allocation 
between crop 1 and crop 2. Hence, affecting profitability of non-agricultural use by subsidies 
is the only way of adjusting the marginal land quality its socially optimal level without 
distorting land allocation within agriculture. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates socially optimal multifunctional landscape. The social optimum implies 
that a buffer strip is established on each parcel of cultivated crops and the buffer strip width 
decreases with land quality (this is indicated by descending graph). Note that private market 
solution does not entail buffer strips.  
Improving land quality q
Crop 2
Water body q ˆ q c
Crop 1
Socially
optimal
buffer
strip
 
Figure 2. The socially optimal multifunctional landscape. 
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Armed with our two models of multifunctionality and their characterizations we next go on to 
empirical application by using Finnish data.   
 
3.  A parametric model of multifunctionality in Finnish agriculture 
 
In this section we apply our general framework of multifunctional agriculture to Finnish 
agriculture by developing a parametric model comprising all parts of our theoretical model. 
We wish to examine quantitatively how much the inclusion of rural viability affects the 
socially optimal design of agriculture as compared with agri-environmental multifunctionality 
and free market solution.  
 
3.1 Parametric model of multifunctional agriculture  
 
The parametric model consists of a quadratic nitrogen response function, exponential nitrogen 
runoff function, damage function from nitrogen runoffs, agrobiodiversity valuation function, 
and rural viability valuation function. The model has been described in detail in Lankoski and 
Ollikainen (2003) and here we describe it briefly. The private profits from the agriculture in 
the absence of government intervention are  
 
( ) [ ] i i i i i i i i i
i rk wn cl l l a p m − − − + + − =
2 ) 1 ( β α π     for i =i,2,         (9) 
 
We use a quadratic nitrogen response function 
2
i i i i i i l l a y β α + + =  which has been estimated 
for rape (crop 1) and spring wheat (crop 2) in clay soils by Heikkilä (1980) and Bäckman et 
al. (1997), respectively. The land quality is incorporated into response function through the 
intercept parameter ai and slope parameter αi  by calibrating the nitrogen response function to 
reflect actual yields in clay soils in Southern Finland in years 2000-2002.   
 
q h h a
q e e a
1 0 2
1 0 1
+ =
+ =
  
q
q
1 0 2
1 0 1
η η α
µ µ α
+ =
+ =
   (10) 
 
All prices and costs are from year 2002 (see Table 1 for parameter values). For the estimation 
of labor and capital costs we have developed standard activity set for field operations: primary   19
tillage, seedbed tillage, planting, herbicide application.
5 Labor cost is based on estimated 
hours/ha for different operations and farmer’s wage rate per hour. Capital cost is based on 
machinery required for aforementioned field operations and machinery expense per hectare 
(which is measured by depreciation cost).  
 
Besides rents from agriculture, 
i π , the social welfare function contains runoff damages, 
agrobiodiversity benefits, and rural viability benefits. While other components are generally 
similar to Lankoski and Ollikainen (2003), rural viability benefits are the new component of 
the model. We assume that rural viability valuation is a linear function of direct and indirect 
labor effects of agriculture. In defining the indirect effects of agricultural production on labor, 
we utilize regional input-output tables for Uusimaa region in Southern Finland, which is a 
representative area for crop production in Finland (Knuuttila 2004). According to Knuuttila 
(2004) the direct employment in agriculture was 7790 years and the overall indirect effect in 
turn was 379 years. This suggests that one hour of work in agriculture causes a 0.0487 hour’s 
increase in the indirect employment. Given that farmers spend 6.57 working hours per 
hectare, we obtain 0.32 hour as the indirect employment effect per hectare from agriculture. 
We assume somewhat arbitrarily that the indirect employment effect from this work can be 
imputed to capital and fertilizer inputs in shares 0.6 and 0.4. Thus, we can define the 
employment (direct agricultural employment plus indirect employment) with the help of the 
following coefficients 
∫∑
=
− + + − = + =
1
ˆ
2
1
) ) 1 ( 0009288 . 0 0013933 . 0 ( ) 1 ( * 57 . 6
q i
i i i i
I a l m k m N N N . From a recent 
study by Yrjölä and Kola 2004 we have as the marginal valuation 5.4 €, so that rural viability 
valuation is given by 5.4N.  
 
The social welfare function for agriculture can now be expressed as 
 
N M Z SW
i 4 . 5 54 57 . 3
1
0
0977 . 0 + + − =∫ ∑π         (11) 
 
In the second term Z denotes the nitrogen runoff and the social value of marginal damage 
(3.57) which is estimated on the basis of Yrjölä and Kola (2004). The nitrogen runoff function 
                                                           
5 We assume here that machinery is same for both crops but the number of tillage operations (e.g. seedbed 
tillage by harrowing) may differ between crops.   20
is 
] ) 1 ( 01 . 0 1 [ 7 . 0 2 . 0 ] 1 [ i i l m
i i e m z
− − − − = φ . The first term on the right hand side of equation, 1-mi
0.2, 
models nitrogen uptake by buffer strips. The calibration is based on Finnish experimental 
studies on grass buffer strips (Uusi-Kämppä and Yläranta, 1992, 1996, Uusi-Kämppä et al. 
2000). The term 
] ) 1 ( 01 . 0 1 [ 7 . 0 i i l m e
− − − φ represents nitrogen runoffs from crop i generated by a 
nitrogen application rate of li  per hectare when buffer strips take up a share of land mi . The 
parameter φ calibrates this expression so that it equals the level of nitrogen runoffs generated 
by a nitrogen application rate of 100 kilos per hectare in the absence of buffers strips. On the 
basis of Finnish experimental studies on the runoff of nitrogen (Turtola and Jaakkola, 1987, 
Turtola and Puustinen, 1998), we set the parameter φ at 15 kg N/ha.  
 
The third term denotes the agrobiodiversity valuation. We link the buffer strip areas to species 
diversity with the help of a study by Ma et al. (2002). They describe the relationship between 
floral species richness and buffer strip area by 
β α ϕ ϕ ψ W S Λ = , where  α ϕ ( B ϕ ) is an estimate 
for the average change in species richness due to an increase in the length (width) of the area 
while keeping the width (length) of the area constant ( 6331 . 1 = ψ ,  0009 . 0 = α ϕ , 
0977 . 0 = β ϕ ). Since the length of the area is fixed, the buffer strip size m uniquely defines 
the width of buffer strip and thus, after having solved for m, we can assess the floral species 
richness by using the coefficients estimated by Ma et al. (2002). Our estimate for 
agrobiodiversity valuation function is given in terms of buffer strip hectares and taken from 
Yrjölä and Kola (2004), which suggests € 54 as average WTP per hectare for biodiversity.  
 
The alternative non-agricultural land use form in our model is forestry. This is an obvious 
choice, as forests are the natural cover of the Finnish landscapes. Moreover, the border 
between agricultural fields and forests has varied across time. We assume that if a parcel of 
forest is converted to agriculture, there is a lump sum conversion cost but the yields obtained 
from this converted land will reflect typical agricultural yields. If a previous cultivated land is 
forested, it will take a long time for this parcel to produce regular forest income. From Finnish 
studies we have an estimate of € 47.8 per ha annual forest income over one rotation period of 
trees in reforested agricultural land. Hence, we set  € 8 . 47 =
NA π . According to Statistical 
Yearbook of Forestry (2001) employment effects of agriculture are 4.5 times to those of 
forestry when measured by the employment effects of an increase of € 10 million in final 
demand for agricultural and forestry products. We will apply this employment information   21
when solving the land allocation between agriculture and forestry. Finally, given that forests 
are so plentiful in Finland, we do not impose any special biodiversity value to changes in the 
forest land. 
 
Other parameter values for our parametric model are reported in Table 1. The arable land area 
is assumed to be 40 hectares (the width of the field area, that is, the distance from the water 
border to the other edge of each parcel is 200 m and the length, that is, border along the 
waterway is 2000 m so that the length of each parcel is 50 m). The base case of our 
parametric model represents the private market solution (without taxes and subsidies) for 
cereals and oilseeds in Finland in 2002.  
 
Table 1. Parameter values in the numerical application. 
Parameter Symbol  Value 
price of rape  p1 €  0.255/kg 
price of wheat  p2 €  0.13/kg 
price of nitrogen fertilizer  c  € 1.2/kg 
basic level of response for crop 1 
basic level of response for crop 2 
slope of the response change for crop 1 
slope of the response change for crop 2 
µ0 
η0 
µ1 
η1 
9.72 
30.8 
0.01 
0.05 
parameter of quadratic nitrogen response 
function 
β  -0.0324 for rape 
-0.094 for wheat 
initial level of productivity for crop 1 
initial level of productivity for crop 2 
slope of the productivity change for crop 1 
slope of the productivity change for crop 2 
e0 
h0 
e1 
h1  
700 
680 
10 
23  
nitrogen leakage at average nitrogen use 
farmer’s wage rate per hour 
farmer’s labor input per hectare 
capital cost 
φ 
w 
n 
rk 
10-20 kg/ha 
€ 11.35/h 
6.57 h/ha 
€ 144/ha 
 
Notes: All prices and costs are from the year 2002. The price of nitrogen is calculated on the basis of a 
compound NPK fertilizer.  
 
 
3.3  Results 
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Maximizing (11) in the absence and presence of nitrogen runoff, biodiversity and viability 
effects produces the privately optimal agricultural production (in the absence of government 
intervention), socially optimal agri-environmental multifunctionality (AE-MFA) and the 
socially optimal provision of non-public good multifunctionality (NPG-MFA).  
 
We have collected our results concerning the private and social optimums in Tables 2 and 3. 
We start with Table 2 that reports average use of inputs per parcel.  
 
Table 2. Average input use per parcel (bold) under alternative solutions (range in 
parentheses). 
 
  Fertilizer use  
Crop 1 
Fertilizer use  
Crop 2 
Buffer strip  
Crop 1 
Buffer strip  
Crop 2 
Private opt.  80.3 
(80.2-80.5) 
122.8 
(120.3-125.4) 
- - 
NPG-MFA   71.2 
(69.8-72.8) 
115.7 
(114.4-117.0) 
0.0417 
(0.0357-0.0477) 
0.0384 
(0.0330-0.0438) 
 
AE-MFA  
 
72.2 
(71.4-73.0) 
116.2 
(115.0-117.4) 
0.0491 
(0.0438-0.0544) 
0.0484 
(0.0399-0.0569) 
 
 
In accordance with our theoretical analysis, the fertilizer intensity increases and the size of the 
buffer strips decreases in land quality over all parcels. (Note that for fertilizer use the first 
figure in parentheses is the lowest land quality cultivated under that crop and for buffer strips 
the first figure is the highest land quality cultivated under that crop.) Relative to the social 
optimum, the private input use is too high for fertilizer and too low for buffer strip (in fact, no 
buffer strips become implemented in private solution). Our model reveals some interesting 
features concerning the average input use in NPG-MFA and AE-MFA optima. Although one 
could expect that the average fertilizer intensity is higher in NPG-MFA than in AE-MFA, this 
feature does not show up in Table 2. The explanation is, however, obvious. From Table 3 
indicating land allocation we can find that under NPG-MFA more land of lower quality is 
allocated in agriculture. Thus, under AE-MFA both crops are cultivated in higher quality 
parcels with higher fertilizer intensity than under NPG-MFA. Restricting attention only on the 
same parcels cultivated both under AE-MFA and NPG-MFA reveals that our expectation is 
actually true. Within this range of qualities, the average fertilizer use under NPG-MFA is 
higher. While the mean rates of fertilizer application are 68.66 kg/ha (crop 1) and 110.57 
kg/ha (crop 2) under AE-MFA, we have for NPG-MFA 69.02 kg/ha (crop 1) and 111.28   23
kg/ha (crop 2).  Finally, in accordance with our theoretical model, the size of buffer strips is 
larger under AE-MFA than under NPG-MFA. 
 
The optimal use of inputs determines land allocation, profits, nitrogen runoffs, floral species 
richness, employment and social welfare. They are collected in totals in Table 3. Note that for 
the floral species richness we account only the number of species sustained by the buffer 
strips. This number indicates the relevant differences between our solutions, because other 
aspects of agrobiodiversity are invariant to different solutions. 
 
Table 3. Multifunctionality indicators. 
 
Policy Land 
allocation 
(NA: C 1: C 2) 
Profit,  
€ 
Runoff,  
kg 
Species,  
# 
Employment
, # 
SW,  
€ 
Private 
optimum 
17 : 3 : 20  2056  391  -  158  1514 
NPG-MFA  2 : 25 : 13  2115  242  83  250  4178 / 
2828 
AE-MFA  12 : 15 : 13  1922  177  83  183  3885 
 
 
Table 3 reveals some striking features of the social optimums. First and in line with the 
discussion in Lichtenberg (2002), we find that the social optima entail new land entering into 
agriculture relative to the private market solution, and yet runoffs are lower and biodiversity 
at a higher level than under market solution. Land allocation under NPG-MFA is driven by 
the fact that agriculture has higher viability value (recall, 4.5 times higher) than forestry. 
When rural viability is not accounted for, AE-MFA entails much more land allocated to 
forestry.  
 
Total agricultural profits are higher in NPG-MFA than in private solution since more land is 
allocated into agriculture. However, in the case of AE-MFA, profits are lower than in the 
private solution due to lower fertilizer use and establishment of buffer strips (although 
agricultural land area is 5 ha higher). Since the size of buffer strips under NPG-MFA and AE-
MFA are close to each other the number of floral species produced by buffers in these 
solutions is same. As expected, Table 3 reveals that the employment rate under NPG-MFA is 
clearly higher than in the private solution or under AE-MFA.  
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The overall social welfare in private solution is clearly inferior to both social optimums. 
NPG-MFA produces highest welfare when rural viability is included in social welfare 
calculation.  If we exclude rural viability, then the social welfare for NPG-MFA is clearly 
below that of AE-MFA. Note that Table 3 includes social welfare only from agricultural land 
use. If we add returns from parcels allocated to forestry the ranking changes. Now the levels 
of welfare relate as follows: Private solution € 2463, NPG-MFA € 4290, AE-MFA € 4458. It 
is the higher share of (non-polluting) forestry that ranks AE-MFA as the best solution for the 
whole society.  
 
4.  Conclusions  
 
We developed a general framework for multifunctional agricultural which includes besides 
the public goods aspects also rural viability valuation as a non-public good item. Our new 
framework contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it can be used to demonstrate how 
the broader definition of multifunctional agriculture differs from the agri-environmental 
multifunctionality. Second it indicates how agri-environmental policy should be reformed to 
reflect rural viability. We focused on just one non-public good aspect, namely viability of 
rural areas. In line with OECD (2001), we described the core economic content of rural 
viability by employment in agriculture and in the rural sectors serving agriculture.  
 
In the theoretical model, we show that rural viability entails adjusting fertilizer tax and buffer 
strip subsidy below their first-best Pigouvian levels to reflect the direct and indirect 
employment effects of agricultural production. Moreover, we showed that when non-
agricultural land use is present, an additional, non-agricultural policy instrument is needed to 
adjust the amount of land allocated to agriculture to its optimal level. In a parametric model 
calibrated to Finnish agricultural conditions, and valuation of agri-environmental amenities 
and rural viability we assess how the socially optimal provision of non-public good 
multifunctionality relates to private market solution and socially optimal agri-environmental 
multifunctionality. 
 
We followed the same strategy as previous AE-MFA literature and focused just on one 
example of non-public goods aspect. Hence, we have to ask next: How much our 
characterization of multifunctionality depends on the chosen aspect of rural viability?   25
Consider first, food security, often mentioned as an important element of multifunctionality.
6  
Suppose that food security takes the form of a national buffer or a domestic self-sufficiency in 
a form of a binding amount of production. Then it is easy to demonstrate that this intensifies 
the use of inputs and moderate policies promoting public goods. Moreover, it will shift more 
land to the cultivation of the crop for which buffers are collected or self-sufficiency 
requirement is placed. This can be easily seen by replacing the argument of B function with 
the amount of crop produced. Alternative approach would be to maximize the target function 
subject to a constraint which requires the production of the crop in question be at least a given 
amount. In this case it is only the Lagrangian multiplier that has the same marginal utility 
interpretation as our B. 
 
How about the other possible elements of multifunctionality? The qualitative effects and 
precise channels will depend on the non-public goods aspects chosen. Interestingly, 
promoting high food safety and quality would have a dual effect. On the one hand, food safety 
promotion may result in the reduction of pesticide use to reduce residues in food (which 
decreases yields in similar way as a reduction in fertilizer application). On the other hand, for 
some crops food quality promotion may even increase the use of fertilizers. This outcome will 
emerge, because sometimes higher nitrogen levels are needed to increase the protein content 
of crops. Promoting animal welfare is an ethical standpoint, and could be described with the 
help of valuation function, such as our B function above. But of course, this analysis should 
not be carried in a crop model but in a livestock model.  
 
In sum, our framework demonstrates for a large set on non-public goods aspects of 
multifunctionality that the first-best Pigouvian policies are amended towards more intensive 
use of agricultural inputs and more land allocated in the more intensive crop. 
                                                           
6 Food security is seen to prevail if people have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious 
food to meet their daily needs. While the economic access belongs to the sphere of general income distribution, 
physical aspect belongs to agriculture. Generally, sudden crises, such as wars, natural disasters or so, are thought 
to be the greatest threat for people’s physical access to daily food. Often the combination of domestic buffers, 
certain level of self-sufficiency and imports are suggested as the means of guaranteeing physical access to food.   26
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